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NOTES
SUSPENDING THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT: THE
"TOLERANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
CARTELS" STANDARD
Section 38 and sections 46 through 48 of the Internal Revenue
Code provide a credit against income tax of a specified percentage of
amounts invested in qualified depreciable property.1  Section
48(a)(7)(D) authorizes the President of the United States to deny the
investment tax credit to purchasers of property that is wholly or sub-
stantially produced in a foreign country if he determines that that
country "engages in discriminatory or other acts (including tolerance
of international cartels) or policies unjustifiably restricting United
States commerce." 2
In May 1982, Houdaille Industries, Inc. (Houdaille)3 filed a
petition to the President with the Office of the United States Trade
1. I.R.C. §§ 38, 46-48 (1982).
2. Section 48(a)(7)(D) provides:
If, on or after the date of the termination of Proclamation 4074 [Dec. 19, 1971],
the President determines that a foreign country-
(i) maintains nontariff trade restrictions, including variable import fees,
which substantially burden United States commerce in a manner inconsis-
tent with provisions of trade agreements, or
(ii) engages in discriminatory or other acts (including tolerance of interna-
tional cartels) or policies unjustifiably restricting United States commerce,
he may provide by Executive order for the application of subparagraph (A) [sec-
tion 48(a)(7)(A)] [excluding foreign produced property from the investment tax
credit] to any article or class of articles manufactured or produced in such for-
eign country for such period as may be provided by Executive order.
Section 48(a)(7)(A) provides:
Property (other than pre-termination property) shall not be treated as Section 38
property [entitled to investment tax credit] if-
(i) such property was completed outside the United States, or
(ii) less than 50 percent of the basis of such property is attributable to
value added within the United States.
For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "United States" includes the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico and the possessions of the United States.
Except for the equipment to which the President denies the tax credit pursuant to section
48(a)(7)(D), subparagraph (A) denies section 38 property status to property described in
section 50 (ie., major capital investment property) that was ordered, or the construction,
reconstruction, or erection of which was begun after August 15, 1971, and on or before
December 19, 1971, the termination date of Proclamation 4074. Id. § 48(a)(7)(D). For
an explanation of the temporary denial of the credit to foreign produced property, see
infra text accompanying notes 50-57.
3. See infra text accompanying note 58.
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Representative requesting that President Reagan invoke his author-
ity under section 48(a)(7)(D) and suspend the investment tax credit
to United States purchasers of Japanese-made numerically con-
trolled machining centers and numerically controlled punching
machines.4 The Reagan Administration rejected the petition in
April 1983.5
The petition remains important because no precedent exists for
suspension of the investment tax credit. This Note examines
whether President Reagan should have exercised his authority under
section 48(a)(7)(D) and denied the tax credit to purchasers of the
Japanese machine tools. The Note first reviews the legislative his-
tory of section 48(a)(7)(D) and the statutes upon which the section is
based. The Note then analyzes the applicability of the section to
Houdaille's allegations. Next, the Note examines the importance of
section 48(a)(7)(D) in the context of existing statutory responses to
unfair import and export trade practices. The Note concludes that
the Congress should retain section 48(a)(7)(D) in its current scope
because the section provides a limited retaliatory response to unfair
foreign export policies that is not available in other federal statutes.
I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Revenue Act of 1971 added section 48(a)(7)(D) to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.6 The Ninety-second Congress based the section
on section 252(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.7 The Eighty-
seventh Congress had derived section 252(b) from section 350(a)(5)
4. Petition to the President of the United States through the Office of the United
States Trade Representative for the Exercise of Presidential Discretion Authorized by
Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971, 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D), filed May 3, 1982, at 1-
2, 15-16 [hereinafter cited as Petition to the President].
Numerically controlled machining centers and numerically controlled punching
machines are used to produce duplicate metal parts one at a time. A numerically con-
trolled machining center is a rotary spindle machine that cuts chips into the metal. A
table that moves in the x, y, and z planes holds and positions the metal so that the
machine cuts the metal at the manufacturer's desired location. In contrast, a numerically
controlled punching machine uses a steel die to punch a particular shape into sheet
metal. The machines are called "numerically controlled" because a mylar or paper tape,
into which the manufacturer has punched holes that cause the machine to produce a part
in conformity with the part's blueprints, govern the cutting and punching. Interview with
Frank Falatyn, President of Ulster Tool and Die Corporation, in Kingston, New York
(Jan. 3, 1983).
5. N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1983, at D5, col. 1. In rejecting the petition, the Office of
the United States Trade Representative nonetheless stated that Houdaille Industries "did
raise questions concerning possible effects of certain Japanese practices." Id.
6. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 103, 85 Stat. 497, 500-01.
7. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 252(b), 76 Stat. 872, 879. See
infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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of the Tariff Act of 1930.8 Because the Ninety-second Congress
defined the discriminatory acts and policies referred to in section
48(a)(7)(D) as the same acts and policies encompassed by section
252(b) of the 1962 Act,9 an examination of section 350(a)(5) of the
Tariff Act of 1930 and section 252(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 facilitates an understanding of section 48(a)(7)(D).
A. SECTION 350(a)(5) OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930
The Trade Agreements Act of 193410 added section 350 to the
Tariff Act of 193011 to promote the recovery of the United States
economy. Congress anticipated that the section would achieve this
result by reversing both the world-wide decline in foreign trade and
the national depressions that had been precipitated by tariffs and
other trade barriers erected by almost every country engaged in for-
eign trade since the 1920's.12 Thus, the purpose of section 350 was
"[t]o expand foreign markets for the products of the United
States."13
8. Tariff Act of 1930 (Hawley-Smoot Act), ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590, amended by Trade
Agreements Act of 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943, amended by Act of June 7, 1943, Pub. L.
No. 66, § 2, 57 Stat. 125, 125, amended by Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, ch.
169, § 3(a)(4), 69 Stat. 162, 164, amended by Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-686, § 3(a)(7), 72 Stat. 673, 673 (repealed 1962). Seeinfra notes 28-41 and
accompanying text and text accompanying notes 83-84 for an explanation of the relation-
ship between section 350(a)(5) of the Tariff Act of 1930 and section 252(b).
9. Although it did not expressly state so, the conference committee for the Revenue
Act of 1971 adopted section 48(a)(7)(D) as a compromise measure. See infra notes 55-57
and accompanying text. In explaining the new section, the conference committee report
stated, "[t]he trade restrictions and discriminatory acts referred to by this provision are
the same as those contained in section 252(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962." H.R.
REP. No. 708, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1971).
10. Trade Agreements Act of 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943.
11. Tariff Act of 1930 (Hawley-Smoot Act), ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590.
12. The undervaluation and overvaluation of various Western currencies and a trend
toward increased protectionism characterized the years between the end of World War I
and the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Almost every importing coun-
try placed duties on imports and erected nontariff barriers in order to gain a favorable
balance of trade by shutting out foreign goods. F. SAYRE, THE WAY FORWARD: THE
AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 17-24 (1939); H. TASCA, THE RECIPROCAL
TRADE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN TRADE PHILOSOPHY 1-4 (1967);
Metzger, The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 51 GEo. L.. 425, 427-28 (1963). The primary
American protectionist statutes were the Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42
Stat. 858 and the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590. Both acts placed tariffs on
almost all imported goods and authorized the President to modify the tariffs, cause addi-
tional tariffs to be placed on foreign imports, and exclude imports in his discretion.
Tariff Act of 1930 §§ 1, 336-338; Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922 §§ 1, 315-317. The
House Ways and Means Committee cited trade barriers as the primary cause of the
decline in world trade. H.R. REP. No. 1000, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934). For a general
discussion of the decline in world trade and the subsequent enactment of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1934, see F. SAYRE, supra, at 16-26; H. TASCA, supra, at 1-44; Metz-
ger, supra, at 426-28.
13. The stated purpose of section 350(a) was:
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Section 350 empowered the President to negotiate with foreign
countries to obtain a reciprocal reduction of American and foreign
tariffs and import restrictions. The President could so act whenever
he found that "any existing duties or other import restrictions of the
United States or any foreign country [were] unduly burdening and
restricting the foreign trade of the United States .... ,u4 Congress
expected that the reciprocal reduction of trade barriers would
increase the level of American exports in two ways. First, the access
of American products to foreign markets would directly increase for-
eign trade in American goods. Second, American import purchases
would raise the income of foreign countries, thereby increasing the
foreign demand for American products.15 Congress thus believed
that the reciprocal reduction would produce a net expansion in the
American economy as the additional domestic activity generated by
the increased level of exports would exceed any decrease in activity
caused by the influx of imports.1 6
Section 350 also incorporated the most-favored-nation princi-
[T] expan[d]. . . foreign markets for the products of the United States (as a
means of assisting in the present emergency in restoring the American standard
of living, in overcoming domestic unemployment and the present economic
depression, in increasing the purchasing power of the American public, and in
establishing and maintaining a better relationship among various branches of
American agriculture, industry, mining, and commerce).
Tariff Act of 1930 (Hawley-Smoot Act), ch. 497, § 350(a), 46 Stat. 590, amendedby Trade
Agreements Act of 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943.
14. Section 350(a) authorized the President:
[W]henever he finds as a fact that any existing duties or other import restrictions
• ..are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the United States
and that the purpose above declared will be promoted by the means hereinafter
specified...
(1) To enter into foreign trade agreements with foreign governments or instru-
mentalities thereof; and
(2) To proclaim such modifications of existing duties and other import restric-
tions, or such additional import restrictions, or such continuance, and for
such minimum periods, of existing customs or excise treatment of any arti-
cle covered by foreign trade agreements, as are required or appropriate to
carry out any foreign trade agreement that the President has entered into
hereunder.
Id
15. As President Franklin Roosevelt explained in his request to the Congress for
authority to enter into trade agreements with other nations:
Important branches of our agriculture, such as cotton, tobacco, hog products,
rice, cereal and fruit raising, and those branches of American industry whose
mass production methods have led the world, will find expanded opportunities
and productive capacity in foreign markets, and will thereby be spared in part, at
least, the heartbreaking readjustments that must be necessary if the shrinkage of
American foreign commerce remains permanent.
A resumption of international trade cannot but improve the general situation
of other countries, and thus increase their purchasing power. Let us remember
that this in turn spells increased opportunity for American sales.
H.R. Doc. No. 273, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
16. Id
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pie 17 by requiring that the United States extend any trade barrier
concessions it had granted one foreign country to all other foreign
countries importing products into the United States.' 8 But the expan-
sion of United States trade would be curtailed if the United States
extended most-favored-nation treatment to a foreign country that
discriminatorily applied trade restrictions against United States
exports. 19 Section 350(a)(2) therefore provided an exception to the
most-favored-nation policy. The section authorized the President to
"suspend the application [of negotiated trade barrier modifications]
to articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of any country
because of its discriminatory treatment of American commerce or
.. . other acts. . . or policies which in his opinion tended to defeat
the purposes set forth in. .. section [350]; . . .- 20
Because section 350 limited the President's authority to negoti-
ate and proclaim reciprocal trade barrier reductions to a three year
period,2' Congress renewed the President's authority in 193722 and
again in 1940.23 While deciding to renew the President's authority
for a third time in 1943, the House Ways and Means Committee
amended section 350(a)(2). The amendment responded to Represen-
tative Charles Dewey's concern that international cartels would
undermine the trade expansion that would otherwise flow from
negotiated reductions in trade barriers.24 House Joint Resolution
111 thus provided for the insertion in section 350(a)(2) of the phrase
"(including the operations of international cartels)" to clarify the
scope of "other acts" 25 allowing suspension of the credit. The final
17. The most-favored-nation principle extends a reduction in a duty on the product
of one country automatically to the similar products of any other country. Every country
trading with the state that has imposed the particular duty thus receives the trade benefits
accorded to the most-favored-nation, whether or not a particular state has negotiated any
trade agreements with the importing country. See The Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 2 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 581, 582-83 (1968).
18. After authorizing the President to negotiate for the reduction of duties and other
import restrictions, section 350(a) continued: "The proclaimed duties and other import
restrictions shall apply to articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of all foreign
countries, whether imported directly or indirectly . . . ." Tariff Act of 1930 § 350(a)(3),
amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943.
19. President Roosevelt also stated in his message to Congress requesting the author-
ity to enter into international trade agreements: "[O]ther governments are to an ever-
increasing extent winning their share of international trade by negotiated reciprocal trade
agreements. ... If the American government is not in a position to make fair offers for
fair opportunities, its trade will be superseded." H.R. Doc. No. 273, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1934). See also H. TASCA, supra note 12, at 42-43.
20. Tariff Act of 1930 § 350(a)(2), amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 48
Stat. 943, 944.
21. Trade Agreements Act of 1934 § 2(c).
22. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1937, ch. 20, 50 Stat. 24.
23. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1940, ch. 96, 54 Stat. 107.
24. See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
25. Act of June 7, 1943, Pub. L. No. 66, § 2, 57 Stat. 125, 125.
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clause of section 350(a)(2) (which clause Congress subsequently
incorporated into section 350(a)(5)),26 as amended by the resolution,
read:
Provided, That the President may suspend the application [of negotiated
trade barrier modifications] to articles the growth, produce, or manufacture
of any country because of its discriminatory treatment of American com-
merce or because of other acts (including the operations of international car-
tels) or policies which in his opinion tend to defeat the purposes set forth in
this section .... 27
B. THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962
Congress passed the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 in compli-
ance with President Kennedy's request for a new instrument in lieu
of a twelfth renewal of the President's negotiating powers under the
Trade Agreements Act.28 The Kennedy Administration's proposal,
26. Section 3(a) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, ch. 169, 69 Stat.
162, 162-65, amended section 350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930. The 1955 Extension Act
substantially expanded the President's authority to proclaim reciprocal trade barrier
reductions. Id § 3(a)(1), at 163. In addition, the 1955 Extension Act placed the most-
favored-nation requirement and the "Provided" language in a new section 350(a)(4),
which consisted exclusively of these provisions. Id. § 3(a)(4), at 164. The "Provided"
language in the new section 350(a)(4) was virtually identical to that in section 350(a)(2)
as amended by House Joint Resolution 111. See infra text accompanying note 27. The
only major change the Eighty-fourth Congress made in the section was to provide that
"the President shall, as soon as practicable, suspend the application . . . ." Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1955 § 3(a)(4), at 164 (emphasis added). The "Provided"
language of section 350(a)(4) thus read:
Provided, That the President shall, as soon as practicable, suspend the applica-
tion [of negotiated trade barrier modifications] to articles the growth, produce, or
manufacture of any country because of its discriminatory treatment of American
commerce or because of other acts (including the operation of international car-
tels) or policies which in his opinion tend to defeat the purposes of this section.
Id The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-686, 72 Stat. 673
(1958), further amended the Tariff Act of 1930 by renumbering section 350(a)(4) as sec-
tion 350(a)(5). Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958 § 3(a)(7).
27. Tariff Act of 1930 § 350(a)(2), amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and
Act of June 7, 1943 § 2 (repealed 1962).
28. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872. In the message
accompanying the Administration's bill, President Kennedy stated: "On June 30, 1962,
the negotiating authority under the last extension of the Trade Agreements Act expires.
It must be replaced by a wholly new instrument. A new American trade initiative is
needed to meet the challenges and opportunities of a rapidly changing world economy."
H.R. Doc. No. 314, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962),reprintedin Trade Expansion Act of1962:
Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means on HA 9900, pt. 1, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, 2 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on HR 9900]. President Kennedy identi-
fied five developments since the last extension of the Act that made a new program neces-
sary: the growth of the European Common Market, the growing pressure on the balance
of payments, the need to accelerate American economic growth, the development of the
Communist aid and trade offensive, and the need for new markets for Japan and the
developing nations. The Administration was particularly concerned with the growth of
the European Economic Community. The President believed that these developments
would prevent him from effectively negotiating trade barrier reductions with Common
Market countries if they imposed a single unified tariff on all goods imported by non-
member countries unless he had the authority to negotiate with the Common Market on
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H.R. 9900,29 reflected the view embodied in section 350 that the
American economy could be expanded most effectively by lowering
tariff and nontariff barriers to trade.30 Thus, the express purposes of
H.R. 9900 were: "to stimulate the economic growth of the United
States, maintain and enlarge foreign markets for the products of
United States industry and agriculture. . . ; [and] to strengthen eco-
nomic and political relations with. . . foreign countries through the
development of an open and nondiscriminatory trading system in
the free world. '31 Although the bill repealed section 350(a)(5) of the
Tariff Act of 1930,32 section 242 of the Administration's proposal
was virtually identical to that section.33
After concluding that the Kennedy Administration's proposal
was poorly drafted, the House Ways and Means Committee rewrote
H.R. 9900.34 The new bill, H.R. 11,970, expanded the President's
authority to negotiate tariff reductions and trade agreements, 35
other than a country-by-country and item-by-item basis. In support of the need for
increased economic growth President Kennedy noted that America had experienced
three recessions since 1955. H.R. Doc. No. 314, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Hear-
ings on H.A 9900, supra at 2.
29. H.R. 9900, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in Hearings on H.? 9900, supra
note 28, at 13-31.
30. H.R. 9900 authorized the President to "enter into trade agreements with foreign
countries or instrumentalities thereof; and . . . [to] proclaim . . . such continuance,
reduction, or elimination of any existing duty or any other import restriction, or such
continuance of existing duty-free or excise treatment, as he determine[d] to be . . .
appropriate to carry out such trade agreements.' Id § 201(a), reprinted in Hearings on
H..R 9900, supra note 28, at 13-14. In response to the President's perceived need to have
additional flexibility to deal with the Common Market, H.R. 9900 permitted him to
negotiate tariff reductions below the 50% of existing duties limit to which he was other-
wise restricted when the Common Market countries and the United States accounted for
greater than eighty percent of the export world value of all such commodities, and when
the negotiations applied to specified commodities. H.R. 9900, §§ 211-213, reprinted in
Hearings on H..R 9900, supra note 28, at 14-15.
31. H.R. 9900, § 102, reprinted in Hearings on H.A 9900, supra note 28, at 13.
32. Id § 248(a), reprinted in Hearings on H.R 9900, supra note 28, at 18.
33. Section 242, entitled "Suspension of Benefits," provided:
The President shall, when he determines that the purposes of this Act will be
promoted thereby, suspend the reduction or elimination of any duty or other
import restriction provided in any proclamation issued in carrying out any trade
agreement under this title or any predecessor Act to products of any foreign
country which engages in discriminatory treatment of United States commerce
or engages in other acts, including the operations of international cartels, or pol-
cies which in his opinion tend to defeat such purposes.
Id § 242, reprinted in Hearings on H.R 9900, supra note 28, at 16. See supra note 26 for
the relevant text of section 350(a)(5).
34. Representative Jackson Betts explained that the House of Representatives
redrafted the proposal because "H.R. 9900 was such a hopeless text that regardless of the
liberal or conservative persuasion of the committee members, a decent regard for their
own sense of craftsmanship compelled them all to join in a virtual complete rewrite of
the bill from a technical point of view." 108 CONG. REc. 12,009 (1962) (statement of
Rep. Jackson Betts).
35. Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibited the President from increasing or
decreasing any duty by more than fifty percent of its rate at the time of the enactment of
1984]
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authorized the Tariff Commission to report the economic effects of
the reductions on domestic industry,36 and instituted an adjustment
assistance program to help any firms and workers harmed by the
increased flow of imports.37 H.R. 11,970 retained the same general
purposes as H.R. 990038 and similarly repealed section 350(a)(5).39
Section 252(b) of the bill, however, narrowed the President's discre-
tion to suspend negotiated trade reductions. Instead of using his
power whenever the purposes of the Act would be promoted,40 the
the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (June 12, 1934) and from transferring any article
between the dutiable and free lists. Tariff Act of 1930 (Hawley-Smoot Act), ch. 497,
§ 350(a)(2), 46 Stat. 590, amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat.
943. H.R. 11,970 increased the President's authority to negotiate trade barrier reductions
in four principal areas. First, the President could negotiate any rate of duty to a level
fifty percent below that existing on July 1, 1962. This was the widest margin given to the
President since 1945. Second, the President could reduce down to zero any duty on arti-
cles in any category where the Common Market and the United States accounted for a
total of at least eighty percent of the world export value of all the articles in that category.
Third, when negotiating with the Common Market, the President could reduce to zero
the tariff on specified agricultural commodities, and, under certain circumstances, tropi-
cal agricultural or forestry commodities. Fourth, except in a trade agreement with a
Communist-dominated country, the President could reduce the duty rate to zero where
the existing rate on July 1, 1962 did not exceed five percent ad valorem or equivalent.
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 §§ 201-220, 231. See generaly S. METZGER, TRADE
AGREEMENTS AND THE KENNEDY RouND 19-29 (1964).
36. Section 301(b)(1) authorized the Tariff Commission, upon request of the Presi-
dent, resolution of either the House Ways and Means Committee or the Senate Finance
Committee, motion of the Tariff Commission, or filing of a petition by a trade associa-
tion, an allegedly injured firm, a certified or recognized union, or another industry repre-
sentative, to conduct an investigation:
... to determine whether, as a result in major part of concessions granted under
trade agreements, an article is being imported into the United States in such
increased quantities as to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to the domes-
tic industry producing an article which is like or directly competitive with the
imported article.
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 301(b)(1). If the Tariff Commission discovered injury,
the President could adjust the relevant tariffs, could allow the industry to apply for
adjustment assistance, and could allow the industry's employees to apply for adjustment
assistance. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 302(a).
37. The Act provided weekly adjustment allowances, vocational readjustment train-
ing, and relocation allowances for workers deemed eligible for adjustment assistance by
the Tariff Commission and the Secretary of Labor. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 §§ 321-
330. Firms deemed eligible for assistance were entitled to financial, technical, and tax
assistance. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 §§ 311-320.
38. The Act states:
The purposes of this Act are, through trade agreements affording mutual trade
benefits-
(1) to stimulate the economic growth of the United States and maintain'
and enlarge foreign markets for the products of the United States agricul-
ture, industry, mining, and commerce;
(2) to strengthen economic relations with foreign countries through the
development of open and nondiscriminatory trading in the free world; and
(3) to prevent Communist economic penetration.
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 102.
39. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 257(b).
40. See supra note 33.
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President could suspend the American trade concessions only when
foreign trade restrictions "substantially burden[ed]" or "unjustifiably
restrict[ed]" United States commerce. 41
C. THE REVENUE ACT OF 1971
On August 15, 1971, President Nixon imposed a ten percent
surcharge on all imported goods, suspended the convertibility of the
dollar into gold, and announced a wage and price freeze in response
to growing unemployment, increased inflation, and the weakening
position of the dollar abroad.42 The President attributed the United
States' economic problems primarily to an overvaluation of the dol-
lar.4 3 This overvaluation had produced balance of trade and balance
of payments deficits,44 as domestic and world demand for the higher-
41. Section 252(b) provided in full:
Whenever a foreign country or instrumentality the products of which receive
benefits of trade agreement concessions made by the United States-
(1) maintains nontariff trade restrictions, including variable import fees,
which substantially burden United States commerce in a manner inconsis-
tent with provisions of trade agreements, or
(2) engages in discriminatory or other acts (including tolerance of interna-
tional cartels) or policies unjustifiably restricting United States commerce,
the President shall, to the extent such action is consistent with the purposes of
section 102-
(A) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of benefits of trade
agreement concessions to products of such country or instrumentality, or
(B) refrain from proclaiming benefits of trade agreement concessions to
carry out a trade agreement with such country or instrumentality.
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 252(b).
42. Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. 602 (1971); Proclamation No. 4074,3 C.F.R. 60
(1971). See Remarks of the President on Nationwide Radio and Television, Aug. 15,
1971 [hereinafter cited as Remarks of the President], reprinted in Tax Proposals Contained
in the President's New Economic Policy: Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and
Means, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Ways and Means Hearings].
43. The President explained on nationwide television:
The third indispensable element in building the new prosperity is closely
related to creating new jobs and halting inflation [the first two elements]. We
must protect the position of the American dollar as a pillar of monetary stability
around the world.
In the past 7 years, there has been an average of one international monetary
crisis every year ... . The gainers are international money speculators.
Because they thrive on crises, they help to create them.
In recent weeks, the speculators have been waging an all-out war on the Amer-
ican dollar.. . . Accordingly, I have directed the Secretary of the Treasury to
take the action necessary to defend the dollar against speculators.
I have directed Secretary Connally to suspend temporarily the convertibility of
the dollar into gold or other reserve assets, except in amounts and conditions
determined to be in the interest of monetary stability and in the best interests of
the United States.
Remarks of the President, supra note 42, reprinted in Ways and Means Hearings, supra
note 42, at 3.
44. The United States balance of payments deficit in the second quarter of 1971 was
equivalent to an annual rate of $23 billion. The United States had a balance of trade
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priced American products had declined. 45 President Nixon sought
to alleviate these deficits through the suspension of the convertibility
of the dollar and the ten percent surcharge on imported goods. By
suspending the convertibility of the dollar until favorable exchange
rates could be reestablished,46 President Nixon intended to stabilize
the valuation of the dollar.47 The surcharge was designed to
encourage Americans to buy domestic products by making imported
goods relatively more expensive.48 By suspending the convertibility
of the dollar and imposing the surcharge, the Nixon Administration
aimed to make "the product of American labor. . . more competi-
tive, and [to remove] the unfair edge that some of our foreign com-
petition has had.' '49
In conjunction with these actions, the President submitted a leg-
islative proposal to Congress that later became the Revenue Act of
1971. One of the principal provisions of the Act was a seven percent
income tax credit for manufacturers who purchased new capital
equipment. 50 The House Ways and Means Committee identified
three purposes for this credit: to create additional jobs by encourag-
ing expenditures on machinery and equipment; to combat inflation
by providing an increased flow of goods into the market; and "by
making our productive facilities more efficient . . . [to] help our
exporters to compete for foreign markets and improve our balance of
payments." 51  Section 103 of the 1971 Act amended the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 to deny the application of the tax credit to
deficit in the second quarter of 1971 of $22 million. H.R. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. 4 (1971).
45. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971); Remarks of the President,
supra note 42, reprinted in Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 42, at 3.
46. After stating in a television address that he had ordered the temporary suspen-
sion of the convertibility of the dollar, Remarks of the President, supra note 42, President
Nixon continued: "In full cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and those
who trade with us, we will press for the necessary reforms to set up an urgently needed
new international monetary system. Stability and equal treatment is in everybody's best
interest." Id , reprinted in Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 42, at 3.
47. Id
48. The President stated:
As a temporary measure, I am today imposing an additional tax of 10 percent on
goods imported into the United States. This is a better solution for international
trade than direct controls on the amount of imports.
This import tax is a temporary action ... . It is an action to make certain
that American products will not be at a disadvantage because of unfair exchange
rates. When the unfair treatment is ended, the import tax win end as well.
Id
49. Id
50. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 101-109, 85 Stat. 497, 498-510.
51. H.R. RaP. No. 533, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 5-6 (1971).
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foreign produced goods52 constructed or acquired before the termi-
nation of the ten percent surcharge. 53 Without this prohibition, Con-
gress feared that the "Buy American" emphasis of the surcharge
would be undermined.5 4
The House version of section 103 did not authorize the Presi-
dent to deny the application of the credit to foreign produced goods
after the expiration of the surcharge. The Senate Finance Commit-
tee, however, amended section 103 of the House bill to permit the
President to continue the suspension of the credit if he determined
that such action would be "in the public interest. ' 55 The conference
committee compromise, which ultimately became section
48(a)(7)(D) of the Internal Revenue Code, authorized the President
to provide, by Executive Order, for the suspension of the credit to
any article produced in a foreign country that:
(i) maintains nontariff trade restrictions, including variable import fees,
which substantially burden United States commerce in a manner inconsistent
with the provisions of trade agreements, or
(ii) engages in discriminatory or other acts (including tolerance of interna-
tional cartels) or policies unjustifiably restricting United States commerce.56
Subsections 48(a)(7)(D)(i) and 48(a)(7)(D)(ii) reproduced verbatim
subsections 252(b)(1) and 252(b)(2) of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962. The conference committee's explanation of 48(a)(7)(D) stated:
"[t]he trade restrictions and discriminatory acts referred to. . . are
the same as those contained in section 252(b) of the Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962." 57
52. Section 103 defined goods as foreign produced if "(i) such property was com-
pleted outside the United States, or (ii) less than 50 percent of the basis of such property
[was] attributable to value added within the United States." Revenue Act of 1971 § 103.
53. Id The surcharge expired on December 19, 1971. Proclamation No. 4074, 3
C.F.R. 60 (1971).
54. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971); S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 8 (1971).
55. S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 26-27 (1971).
56. Revenue Act of 1971 § 103.
57. The conference committee's Joint Explanatory Statement for section 48(a)(7)(D)
stated:
The Senate amendment authorizes the President to continue the application of
the foreign property provision of the bill, when he terminates Presidential proc-
lamation 4074 [imposing the ten percent surcharge on imports], to any article or
class of articles, or to any article or class of articles manufactured or produced in
any foreign country, if he determines such action to be in the public interest.
The House recedes with an amendment. Under the conference agreement, if
on or after the date of the termination of Proclamation 4074, the President deter-
mines that a foreign country maintains nontariff trade restrictions, including
variable import fees, which substantially burden United States commerce in a
manner inconsistent with provisions of trade agreements, or engages in discrimi-
natory or other acts (including tolerance of international cartels) or policies
unjustifiably restricting United States commerce, he may by Executive order
apply the foreign property provision of the bill to any article or class of articles
manufactured or produced in such foreign country for such period as may be
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II
HOUDAILLE INDUSTRIES, INC.'S PETITION FOR
SUSPENSION OF THE INVESTMENT
TAX CREDIT
On May 3, 1982, Houdaille Industries, Inc., a Florida corpora-
tion and manufacturer of numerically controlled machining centers
and numerically controlled punching machines, filed a petition with
the Office of the United States Trade Representative.58 The petition
requested the President to suspend the investment tax credit for Jap-
anese-made numerically controlled machining centers and numeri-
cally controlled punching machines, based on the "tolerance of
international cartels" criteria of section 48(a)(7)(D)(ii).5 9
Houdaille specifically alleged that the Japanese Government
has encouraged and subsequently tolerated the formation of a cartel
among Japanese machine tool manufacturers. 60 Houdaille further
contended that the manufacturers formed the Japanese machine tool
cartel in compliance with three "Extraordinary Measures" laws
enacted to promote the "rationalization" of the machine tool indus-
try.6, 1 Pursuant to these laws, which have been consecutively in force
provided by Executive order. The trade restrictions and discriminatory acts
referred to by thisprovision are the same as those contained in section 252(b) of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
H.R. REp. No. 708, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1971) (emphasis added).
58. Petition to the President, supra note 4.
59. The petition specifically stated that:
The petitioner Houdaille Industries, Inc. [hereinafter 'Houdaille'], has uncovered
conclusive evidence that the Japanese Government instigated the formation of
this [machine-tool] cartel and continues to shield its members from competition
by sanctioning market allocation and other anticompetitive agreements and
practices. This is exactly the situation for which Congress provided a remedy in
Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971. Section 103 delegates to the President
authority to suspend eligibility of foreign-made products for the investment tax
credit when he determines that a foreign government has unjustifiably restricted
United States commerce by its 'tolerance of international cartels.'
Id at 1-2. The petition asked the President to deny the credit for an indefinite period of
time, and to review the desirability of continuing the denial in five years. Id at 15-16.
60. Id at 2-13, 53-115.
61. Id at 54-87. These three laws are the Extraordinary Measures Law for the Pro-
motion of Machinery Industry (Law No. 154 of 1956) [hereinafter cited as Extraordinary
Measures Law No. 1], reprinted in Petition to the President, supra note 4, at DI (Appen-
dix); Extraordinary Measures Law for Promotion of Specific Electronics Industries and
Specific Machinery Industries (Law No. 17 of 1971) [hereinafter cited as Extraordinary
Measures Law No. 2], reprinted in Petition to the President, supra note 4, at D67 (Appen-
dix); and Extraordinary Measures Law for Promotion of Specific Machinery and Infor-
mation Industries (Law No. 84 of 1978) [hereinafter cited as Extraordinary Measures
Law No. 3], reprinted in Petition to the President, supra note 4, at D109 (Appendix).
Each law authorizes the Japanese Minister of International Trade and Industry to issue
ordinances establishing rationalization plans to implement the goals of the Acts. These
goals include concerted action by machine tool manufacturers to restrict the kinds of
products, to establish quotas for the products produced, to coordinate the purchase of
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since 1956, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Indus-
try has issued a series of ordinances62 requiring machine tool manu-
facturers to coordinate the types63 and quantity64 of the products that
they manufacture, to allocate production among themselves in order
to "promote joint undertakings within the group," 65 and to "make
efforts to normalize terms and conditions of export transactions and
to seek to establish . . . [an] exporting system. ' 66 Houdaille also
parts and materials, to improve quality, and to develop new production technologies.
See, e.g., Extraordinary Measures Law No. 1, Art. 6 (The Minister of International
Trade and Industry may instruct manufacturers to restrict kinds of products, impose
manufacturing quotas on types of products, restrict technology, and follow particular
purchasing methods for parts and materials.); Extraordinary Measures Law No. 2, Art. 3
(The Minister of International Trade and Industry shall formulate an "Elevation Plan"
stipulating contents of industry experimentation and research, production goals for target
fiscal years, and types and quantity of equipment to be installed); Extraordinary Meas-
ures Law No. 3, Art. 3 (The Minister of International Trade and Industry shall formulate
an "Elevation Plan" specifying performance, quality and production cost targets, appro-
priate production scale, joint operation of enterprises, or specialization of types of goods
to be manufactured; and experimentation, research, and technique improvement targets.)
62. Petition to the President, supra note 4, at 60-68, 80-81, 84-87.
63. See, e.g., Notification No. 346 of the Ministry of International Trade and Indus-
try § 3(1) (1971), reprinted in Petition to the President, supra note 4, at D98, D99 (Appen-
dix) (instructing the machine tool manufacturing industry to "try to increase the degree
of specialization so that the production share of numerically controlled cutting machine
tools and computer controlled metal cutting machine tools in each manufacturing enter-
prise is increased to approximately 50 percent of the total production of the ... tools
manufactured"); Ministry of International Trade and Industry Notification No. 112
§ 4(1) (1957), reprinted in Petition to the President, supra note 4, at D26, D28 (Appendix)
(requiring machine tool manufacturers "[tlo promote specialization of the manufacturing
of product[s] by kind and to seek . . . centralization of manufacturing by such
product[s].")
64. See, e.g., Notification No. 346 § 3(1), supra note 63; Notification No. 305 of Min-
istry of International Trade and Industry § 4(1) (1968), reprinted in Petition to the Presi-
dent, supra note 4, at D61, D62-63 (Appendix) (requiring machine tool manufacturers
"to promote adjustment of product types ... and in case the appropriate production size
can not be attained even by adjustment within the group to prepare concrete plans for
promoting adjustment with other groups or other enterprises, or reorganization of the
groups, and to expedite implementation of such plans").
65. Notification No. 304 of Ministry of International Trade and Industry § 6(2)
(1968), reprinted in Petition to the President, supra note 4, at D41, D45 (Appendix)
(instructing firms "[t]o promote joint activities within the group in the field of production
marketing, exportation, technical development, etc."). See also Notification No. 305
§ 8(2), supra note 64 (instructing firms "[t]o promote joint undertaking within the group
in ways of production, marketing, technological development, etc.").
66. Notification No. 304 § 6(4), supra note 65. See also Notification No. 305 § 8(4),
supra note 64 (authorizing machine tool manufacturers "[t]o make efforts in nomalizing
the terms and conditions to export trades and to seek to establish earnest exporting
system").
The ordinances promulgated by the Ministry for International Trade and Industry
pursuant to Extraordinary Measures Law No. 3, supra note 61, focused on promoting
joint research and on standardizing manufacturing components in order to increase the
production level of numerically controlled machine tool parts and to increase the indus-
trialization of the industry. See, e.g., Ministry of International Trade and Industry Ordi-
nance No. 608 (1978), reprinted in Petition to the President, supra note 4, at D145
(Appendix) (setting forth subject matter of experimentation and research to be conducted
within the industry); Ministry of International Trade and Finance Ordinance No. 614
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alleged that the Japanese Government has encouraged and tolerated
the machine tool cartel through governmental promotion of cartels
in order to advance exports, 67 exemption of the cartel from the Japa-
nese Anti-Monopoly laws,6 8 and utilization of a variety of political
and tax favors.69 These favors include subsidies to the Japanese
machine tool industry that are derived form the proceeds of bicycle
and motorcycle races,70 loan authorizations to the industry on con-
cessionary terms not available to foreign competitors, 71 and income
tax deductions to the companies in the industry based upon each
company's gross export income72 and income realized from revenues
§ 4(4) (1978), reprinted in Petition to the President, supra note 4, at D169, D171 (Appen-
dix) (instructing manufacturers of numerically controlled metal cutting machine tool
devices "[t]o promote standar[d]ization of numerically controlled metal cutting machine
tool devices, such as tooling, pallet, etc."); Ministry of International Trade and Industry
Ordinance No. 615 § 4(3) (1978), reprinted in Petition to the President, supra note 4, at
D177, D179 (Appendix) (requiring machine tool manufacturers "[t]o improve joint
research system with manufacturers of safety equipment, electric devices and other
related equipment in order to help seek automatic control, expansion of functions, pro-
motion of safety and decrease in pollution ...
67. Petition to the President, supra note 4, at 87-96. Article 5 of the Export and
Import Trading Law, Law No. 299, August 5, 1952, allows exporters to enter into an
agreement determining "price, quantity, quality, design, or any other matter" concerning
the export trading of a commodity. Article 11 of the Export and Import Trading Law
authorizes the creation of an export association to establish agreements among members
relating to "'price, quantity, quality, design, or any other matter in the export trading of
commodities [of] the particular kind to be exported to [a] specific destination."' See id
at 88-89.
68. The Japanese Government has provided the machine tool industry with two
types of antitrust immunity. Machine tool manufacturers receive dejure immunity under
the Extraordinary Measures Laws for conduct that complies with Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry ordinances. In addition, the manufacturers allegedly receive
defacto immunity for activities pursued in response to the Ministry's basic rationaliza-
tion plans. Petition to the President, supra note 4, at 57-60, 89-90.
69. See Petition to the President, supra note 4, at 95-115; Petition to the President of
the United States through the Office of the United States Trade Representative for the
Exercise of Presidential Discretion Authorized by Section 103 of the Revenue Act of
1971, 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D): Comments by the Petitioner, filed July 31, 1982, 1-33
[hereinafter cited as Comments by the Petitioner]. See also infra notes 70-73 and accom-
panying text.
70. Comments by the Petitioner, supra note 69, at 2-21; Petition to the President,
supra note 4, at 109-15. Houdaille alleged that the Japan Bicycle Rehabilitation Associa-
tion and the Japan Motorcycle Rehabilitation Association distribute a portion of the pro-
ceeds generated through bicycle and motorcycle race wagering to machine tool
manufacturers. Although the Japanese Government regulates motorcycle and bicycle
racing, the racing associations do retain a portion of the wagers. In 1980, the subsidy to
the machinery industry from these combined sources was allegedly $105 million. Com-
ments by the Petitioner, supra note 69, at 19.
71. The petition stated that the Japanese Government has made long-term, low inter-
est loans available to the machinery industry since 1956 through the Japan Development
Bank and the Small Business Finance Corporation. The loans are not available to other
industries nor to foreign machine tool manufacturers. Houdaille contended that these
loans have been "significant tools of industrial policy" in promoting the machine tool
industry. Petition to the President, supra note 4, at 102-07.
72. Houdaille argued that from 1964 to 1974 the Japanese Government gave manu-
facturers "special additional depreciation" by increasing standard depreciation deduc-
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received in foreign currencies for industrial property rights.73
Houdaille contended that a suspension of the investment tax
credit would return a significant share of the domestic market to
American machine tool manufacturers.74 In particular, Houdaille
calculated that the cartel members would have to decrease the price
of their machine tool parts by 15.18 percent in order to offset the loss
that American purchasers would realize from the parts' ineligibility
for the tax credit.75 Because the existing average profit margin of
Japanese machine tool manufacturers is less than fifteen percent,76
Houdaille alleged that the cartel would be unable to maintain this
price decrease for an extended period of time and would conse-
quently relinquish its competitive position to American machine tool
manufacturers. 77
tions by the percentage of a company's export income to total income. Petition to the
President, supra note 4, at 99.
73. Income from the export of technology is allegedly partially exempted from the
Japanese income tax. Japanese exporters receive a tax deduction equal to a percentage
of all revenues received in foreign currencies for technical services, copyrights, and
industrial property rights. Id at 100-01. In addition to this deduction and the deprecia-
tion based on a company's export income, see supra note 72, alleged tax favors have also
included accelerated depreciation to industries favored by the Japanese Government;
depreciation deductions to establish overseas offices; and deductions to establish a
"reserve for the cancellation of export contracts." The accelerated depreciation deduc-
tion is still available. Petition to the President, supra note 4, at 97-100.
74. Petition to the President, supra note 4, at 150-56.
75. Id at 150-54. Houdaille based its calculation on the benefits accruing to the
purchaser of a $100,000 machine tool. Houdaille assumed that the purchase would gen-
erate a 3.75% depreciation deduction and a $2500 investment tax credit in each quarter of
the year of purchase. If the purchaser calculates his income tax at the maximum corpo-
rate rate of forty-six percent, the net cash return to the purchaser after depreciation and
deducting the credit is $4,225 for each quarter of the purchase year. After the net cash
return is discounted at an eight percent interest rate to establish the present value of the
future benefits, the purchaser's net after-tax payment for a machine tool eligible for the
credit is $53,000. In contrast, the purchaser of a machine tool ineligible for the credit can
reduce his tax liability only by deducting the depreciation to which he is entitled. At an
interest rate of eight percent, the manufacturer of a machine tool ineligible for the credit
would have to lower the price of a $100,000 machine tool to $84,825 to provide the pur-
chaser with the same after tax cost. This reduction is a 15.175% decrease in price. Id
76. The petition stated that the average pre-tax profit margin for the seven leading
Japanese manufacturers of machine tools in 1981 was 14.75%. Id at 155 n.1 (citing
JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Mar. 23, 1982, at 16).
77. Petition to the President, supra note 4, at 155. Houdaille assumed that the inabil-
ity of the Japanese producer to absorb the price decrease over an extended period of time
would result in the Japanese manufacturers withdrawing their machine tools from the
American market. Id Houdaille acknowledged that the Japanese machine-tool manu-
facturers might have shifted their production to the United States to qualify for the
credit, but did not object to this possible change of production sites because the reloca-
tion would have increased the employment rate of American machine tool industry
employees. Id at 155-56. Houdaille's analysis did not consider the possibility, however,
that the members of the cartel could have used their control in the Japanese market to
increase the price of the machine tools they sold in Japan. A sufficiently high price
increase in the Japanese market would have raised the manufacturers' average profit
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The petition presented two major arguments to support the
application of section 48(a)(7)(D)'s denial of the investment tax
credit to American purchasers of Japanese machine tools. First, the
Japanese cartel is an "international cartel" because section
48(a)(7)(D)(ii) applies both to cartels that have an international
membership and cartels that have an international effect.78 Second,
the displacement of American machine tool manufacturers by Japa-
nese producers supplying the American market unjustifiably restricts
"United States commerce," because, as used in section




In enacting the Revenue Act of 1971, Congress specified that the
trade restrictions and discriminatory acts in response to which the
President could deny the investment tax credit were the same poli-
cies and acts contained in section 252(b) of the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962.80 As discussed below, the meanings Congress assigned to
these policies and acts in section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971 and
its predecessor statutes prohibited the President from suspending the
credit to American purchasers of Japanese machine tools. In partic-
ular, a suspension of the investment tax credit would have expanded
the scope of section 48(a)(7)(D)(ii) beyond that intended by the
Ninety-second Congress. That expansion was unwarranted because
existing trade legislation currently provides retaliatory measures to
respond to the influx of imports into the United States when such an
influx is attributable to a foreign country's tolerance of international
cartels.
margin above 15.175% and enabled them to maintain over an extended period of time
the 15.175% price decrease necessary to offset the loss of the tax credit.
78. Id at 38-42.
79. Id at 19-34. From 1976 to 1981 the American manufacturers' share of the
domestic market for numerically controlled machining centers declined from 95.1% to
48.7%. During the same period, the portion of the domestic market supplied by Japanese
manufacturers increased from 3.7% to 50.1%. The American manufacturers' share of the
domestic market for numerically controlled punching machines was 87.6% in 1976 and
53.9% in 1981. The Japanese manufacturers' share increased from 4.7% in 1976 to 37.6%
in 1981. Id at 117. Houdaille alleged that the changes in the American and Japanese
manufacturers' market shares resulted from the Japanese Government's rationalization
program and its attendant political and tax policies. Id at 115-37.
80. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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A. "TOLERANCE OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS"
Congress's insertion of the phrase "including tolerance of inter-
national cartels" after "discriminatory or other acts" in section
48(a)(7)(D)(ii) of the Revenue Act of 1971 indicates that a govern-
ment's tolerance of international cartels constitutes an act that would
justify the President's suspension of the investment tax credit. Nev-
ertheless, the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1971 does not
define "international cartel." The conference committee's reference
to section 252(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,81 however,
requires that "international cartel" be defined in accordance with the
Eighty-seventh Congress's construction of that term in the 1962 Act.
The legislative history of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 indi-
cates that "international cartel," as used in section 252(b), retained
the same meaning that the Seventy-eighth Congress assigned to it in
the 1943 amendment to section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The
House Ways and Means Committee patterned section 252(b) of the
1962 Act after section 242 of H.R. 9900, the Kennedy Administra-
tion's proposal.82 The Kennedy Administration, however, had delib-
erately drafted section 242 in accordance with section 350(a)(5) of
the Tariff Act of 1930.83 The Administration's analysis of H.R. 9900
thus stated that "this section [section 242] is substantially identical to
the provision of section 350(a)(5) of the Trade Agreements Act of
1934, as amended." 84 In addition, by authorizing the President to
negotiate reciprocal trade concessions,85 the Eighty-seventh Con-
81. Id.
82. Section 242 of H.R. 9900 was obviously the prototype for section 252 of the
Trade Expansion Act. Section 242 authorized the President to:
suspend the reduction or elimination of any duty or other import restriction pro-
vided in any proclamation ... to products of any foreign country which engages
in discriminatory treatment of United States commerce or engages in other acts,
including the operations of international cartels, or policies which in his opinion
tend to defeat. . . [the] purposes [of the Act] ...
H.R. 9900, § 242, reprinted in Hearings on H.J. 9900, supra note 28, at 16. Section 252(b)
authorized the President to "suspend, withdraw or prevent the application of benefits of
trade agreement concessions" or to "refrain from proclaiming the benefits of trade agree-
ment concessions" when a foreign country "engages in discriminatory or other acts
(including the tolerance of international cartels) or policies unjustifiably restricting
United States commerce." Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 252, 76
Stat. 872, 879. For the full text of section 252(b), see supra note 41.
83. See supra notes 14, 26 & 33 and infra text accompanying note 84.
84. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (H.R. 9900) as
Prepared by the Executive Branch, reprinted in Hearings on H.R 9900, supra note 28, at
36.
85. Section 201 contained the basic authorization permitting the President to negoti-
ate trade agreements. Section 201 provided, in pertinent part:
(a) Whenever the President determines that any existing duties or other
import restrictions of any foreign country or the United States are unduly bur-
dening and restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that any of the
purposes stated in section 102 will be promoted thereby, the President may-
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gress retained section 350's trade expansion policy in the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962.86 Therefore, in the absence of a contrary
legislative intent, section 252(b) and section 350(a)(5) should be con-
strued consistently.
The hearings and debates conducted prior to the adoption of
House Joint Resolution 11187 indicate that the Seventy-eighth Con-
gress was concerned only with cartels possessing a multinational
membership. During the hearings, members of Congress, particu-
larly Representative Charles Dewey, the drafter of the amendment,
repeatedly questioned witnesses as to the ability of multinational
cartels to upset or undercut the tariff rates established by trade agree-
ments.8 8 Significantly, no member of Congress discussed the ability
(1) after June 30, 1962, and before July 1, 1967, enter into trade agree-
ments with foreign countries or instrumentalities thereof; and
(2) proclaim such modification or continuance of any existing duty or
other import restriction, such continuance of existing duty-free or excise
treatment, or such additional import restrictions, as he determines to be
required or appropriate to carry out any such trade agreement.
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 201(a), 76 Stat. 872, 872. The Act
also retained the most-favored-nation policy of the Tariff Act of 1930. Id § 251.
86. Luther Hodges, Secretary of Commerce, explained the need to allow the Presi-
dent to negotiate reciprocal reductions in trade barriers as follows:
The only way to meet these targets [increased economic growth and decreased
unemployment] is to sell more products, to expand the markets in which the
goods of American industry, farms, mines and fisheries are sold .... The
Trade Expansion Act will pave the way for greater growth of the U.S. economy
by providing access to new expanding world markets.
Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 28, at 31 (statement of Luther Hodges, U.S. Secretary
of Commerce).
87. Act of June 7, 1943, Pub. L. No. 66, 57 Stat. 125. See supra notes 24-25 and
accompanying text.
88. For example, Representative Dewey stated:
I was wondering if the cartels as they were developed in Europe, where indus-
try, we will say, in Germany, France, and Great Britain, or whatever other coun-
tries, are so combined that they could offset the provisions of a trade agreement
made with any one of those three countries. In other words, if we had a high-
tariff arrangement with one of them, could the cartel so operate that they could
put their trade through that country that had a favorable rate, which would not
be extended to the other countries that did not have such favorable rates for one
reason or another? That is what I have been trying to find out from practical
people, what were the effects of international cartels in regard to our trade agree-
ments, not so much as regards monopolistic practices that might be carried on
between them.
Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means on H.J Res. 111: A Joint Resolution
to Extend the Authority of the President Under Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
Amended, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 626 (1943) (statement of Rep. Charles Dewey) [hereinaf-
ter referred to as Hearings on IIJ Res. 111].
Earlier in the hearings, Dewey defined international cartels in the same manner:
Mr. Dewey: There are informal, bilateral, and sometimes multilateral agree-
ments in various lines of products, are there not?
Mr. Crowther. Yes.
Mr. Dewey: That could completely offset any trade agreements, formal trade
agreements, between the countries---
Mr. Crowther. Completely.
1984] SUSPENDING INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT
of a national cartel to hinder the expansion of world trade.8 9 Fur-
thermore, in explaining the purpose of the amendment, Representa-
tive Dewey traced the development of the cartel movement and
specifically distinguished between national and international car-
tels.90 To illustrate the effects of international cartels upon recipro-
cal trade agreements, Dewey cited the International Tin Committee,
a cartel composed of British, Bolivian, Belgian and Dutch firms.91
The Seventy-eighth Congress's findings about the manner in
which international cartels inhibit trade expansion suggests that the
term "international cartel" should not be construed to include cartels
of a single nationality. Congress was not concerned with a national
Mr. Dewey: Who are participants in the cartels. Is that true?
Id at 468.
In addition, Representative Harold Knutzen asked Francis Sayre, Assistant Secretary
of State: "Who put the price of rubber up in the skies? It was a cartel-was it not-made
up of Dutch and British rbber producers?" Id at 191.
89. Dewey and other members of Congress recognized that national and interna-
tional cartels "allocate fields of production and maintain monopolistic price levels." 89
CONG. REc. 4180 (1943) (statement of Rep. Charles Dewey). Congress's focus, however,
was not on an individual cartel's monopolistic practices, but on the ability of interna-
tional cartels to coordinate their activities and control the introduction of products
throughout the world. See, e.ag, Hearings on H.J Res. 111, supra note 88, at 625-26
(statement of Rep. Charles Dewey); 89 CONG. REc. 4180-81 (1943) (statement of Rep.
Charles Dewey). The focus by Dewey and the other members of Congress on the effects
of international cartels suggests that Congress did not consider the impact of national
cartels in reducing the level of world trade to be sufficiently significant to merit statutory
attention. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
90. Representative Dewey stated:
Cartels are not in their inception a product of the twentieth century .... In
general, the cartel movement in Europe paralleled the development of trusts in
this country, with the difference that, particularly in Germany, national cartels
have enjoyed the protection and subsidy of government.
The industries and markets in which cartels and cartel arrangements exist are
too numerous to analyze in detail. . . .Trade policies which endeavor to adjust
tariffs in order to stimulate the interchange of commodities between the United
States and other nations can be completely nullified by the existence of interna-
tional cartels.
Take one of many possible examples: For many years the production, price,
and international trade in tin have been controlled by a British-dominated cartel
known as the International Tin Committee. In 1938 this international cartel
renewed for a period of 5 years its control scheme limiting tin output ....
On September 9, 1942, an agreement was signed by representatives of Great
Britain, Bolivia, Belgium, the Netherlands and the International Tin Committee
to preserve the machinery for post-war control of the production and price of tin
That is only one of many examples that could be presented as to the opera-
tions of international cartels and the manner in which they tend to defeat the
very purposes of reciprocal trade agreements.
89 CONG. Rc. 4180-81 (1943) (statement of Rep. Charles Dewey).
91. See id
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cartel's monopolistic ability to restrict output and raise prices. 92
Although Congress acknowledged that such cartels could reduce the
level of foreign trade,93 it did not consider the harm serious enough
to require remedial legislation.94 Rather, Congress sought to restrain
the activities of cartels that can control the world market for particu-
lar products and shift their products among member nations in order
to take advantage of varying tariff rates.95 The inability of a cartel
within a single country to select the nations within which it will mar-
ket its products consequently excludes the Japanese machine tool
cartel from the phrase "international cartel."
B. UNITED STATES COMMERCE
The Ninety-second Congress added section 48(a)(7)(D) to the
Revenue Act of 1971 to protect the United States' balance of pay-
ments. Although the Nixon Administration intended the ten percent
import surcharge and the suspension of the convertibility of the dol-
lar to help check the balance of payments deficit, 96 Congress found
that these methods by themselves would prove insufficient because
foreign trade barriers had also contributed to the deficit. 97 Congress
92. For example, Representative Dewey terminated the discussion of a German opti-
cal company's agreement with Bausch & Lomb not to import their products to America
by saying:
It seems to me that your illustration points more to monopolistic practices here
in the United States than it does to any matter of trade treaty, because you say
that in this case the German optical companies agreed not to come into this
market. Now, that leaves a monopoly here in this market, which is outside of
our present consideration. . .. What I have been attempting to do is to find if
national cartels were effective in upsetting or undercutting the provisions of the
rates established by those various trade agreements.
Hearings on .J Res. 111, supra note 88, at 625-26 (statement of Rep. Charles Dewey).
93. See, e.g., 89 CONG. Rac. 4180 (1943). In discussing the general effect of cartels,
Representative Dewey recognized that "[c]artels are usually based on the efforts of small
groups of powerful monopolies to corner supplies of raw materials, to amass huge patent
structures and to employ their financial strength to 'regulate' output, divide markets,
allocate fields of protection and maintain monopolistic price levels." 89 CONG. REc.
4180 (1943) (statement of Rep. Charles Dewey).
94. Although Dewey acknowledged the effect that national cartels have on trade, see
id, his focus on the effects of international cartels suggests that he and the other mem-
bers of Congress did not believe that the impact of national cartels in reducing the level
of world trade was sufficiently significant to merit Congressional action. See supra notes
88-90.
95. See supra notes 88-92. In his explanation Dewey focused on the international
cartels which "interfered with the free operation of our foreign trade both export and
import by dividing up world markets, limiting output and preventing the introduction of
new materials and processes." 89 CONG. Rc. 4180 (1943) (statement of Rep. Charles
Dewey) (emphasis added).
96. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
97. The Ways and Means Committee report explained: "These difficulties in our
balance of payments are, of course, a result of a number of complex factors including
inflation at home and discriminatory trade practices abroad." H. RE'. No. 533, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971).
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viewed the establishment and continued availability of the invest-
ment tax credit as a long-term method of enhancing the United
States' competitive position in foreign markets and of ultimately
improving the balance of payments.98 Moreover, Congress found
that a denial of the credit would restrain the otherwise resultant
decline in the balance of payments when foreign trade practices pro-
duced declines in American export trade. The increase in the effec-
tive cost of and subsequent decrease in the demand for imported
goods99 would provide the President with the leverage necessary to
persuade the discriminating country to discontinue its restrictive
practice. °° In view of this expressed purpose of the credit, Congress
intended the term "United States commerce" in subsection
48(a)(7)(D)(i) and subsection 48(a)(7)(D)(ii) to connote United
States foreign commerce.
The events surrounding the conference committee's formulation
of section 48(a)(7)(D) further substantiate the preceding interpreta-
tion of "United States commerce." The Senate proposal, which
authorized the President to suspend the credit whenever he deemed
such action to be "in the public interest," would have allowed the
President to deny the credit when a high level of imports threatened
the balance of payments. 101 The conference committee's bill, how-
98. The Ways and Means Committee report explained: "[Bly making our productive
facilities more efficient the new credit will help our exporters to compete for foreign
markets and improve our balance of payments." H. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. 6
(1971). Secretary of the Treasury John Connally's statement before the Finance Com-
mittee illustrates the emphasis placed on the credit as a long-term instrument for improv-
ing the United States balance of payments. Connally stated that "the really clinching
argument for a long-run credit of at least 7 percent. . . stems from the well recognized
need for the United States to enhance its competitive position in world trade." Revenue
Act of 1971: Hearings on H.R 10947Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1971) (statement of John Connally, Secretary of the Treasury).
99. The Finance Committee recognized that a denial of the credit would discourage
the purchase of goods not qualifying for the favorable tax treatment. The committee
proposed to allow the President to deny selectively the credit to restrain the increased
level of imports that the Senate feared would result from the simultaneous termination of
the surcharge and allowance of the credit for foreign produced goods. S. REP. No. 437,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1971). This proposed amendment was rejected in favor of sec-
tion 48(a)(7)(D). See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
100. Senators Robert Packwood and Jacob Javits unsuccessfully attempted to remove
section 103 from the Revenue Act of 1971 when the Act was before the Senate. 117
CONo. Rnc. 42, 663-65 (1971). In defending the provision, Senator Russell Long stated:
"This is one of the tools we think should be in the hands of the President to protect this
Nation's interest and assist him to negotiate a bargain for the removal of barriers against
American products." Ad at 42,664 (statement of Sen. Russell Long). Senator Wallace
Bennet supported Senator Long's assertion, stating: "[The denial of the tax credit]. . . is
another blue chip in his negotiating process. It is something he can give up when he feels
he has been given an adequate quid pro quo.. . .I think this provision strengthens his
hand." Id (statement of Sen. Wallace Bennet).
101. Indeed, the Senate Finance Committee explained that it proposed the amend-
ment because the committee was "concerned that the combined price effect of automati-
cally reinstating the credit for foreign property at the same time as the 10 percent import
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ever, rejected this approach. Senator Russell Long, the chairman of
the Senate Finance Committee, noted that the conference amend-
ment provided a method of "offsetting. . . discriminations imposed
by foreign countries with respect to U.S. products." 10 2 Moreover,
Representative Wilbur Mills, in explaining the conference commit-
tee bill, emphasized that both subsection 48(a)(7)(D)(i) and subsec-
tion 48(a)(7)(D)(ii) referred to restrictions against American exports.
His summary of the changes made by the conference committee in
the House and Senate bills highlighted the President's authority to
suspend the investment tax credit "with respect to an article (or class
of articles) manufactured in a foreign country if he determines that
the country maintains burdensome non-tariff trade restrictions
against U.S. exports or engages in discriminatory actions or policies
which unjustfably restrict U.S. exports." 0 3
Although the Eighty-seventh Congress did not define the term
"United States commerce" in either the legislative history or the text
of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act,104 several concomitant factors sup-
port the interpretation of the term as United States foreign com-
merce. First, the 1962 Act relied on the expansion of American
export trade as the means of promoting the expansion of the Ameri-
can economy. 05 Second, the members of Congress consistently dis-
cussed subsection 252(b) of the Act in terms of the authority it gave
surcharge is terminated might have a significant adverse effect on the balance of pay-
ments." SEN. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 26 (1971).
102. 117 CONG. REc. 45,818 (1971) (statement of Sen. Russell Long).
103. 117 CONG. REc. 45,855 (1971) (emphasis added). The summary of section
48(a)(7)(D) provided in fulh
As a further means of aiding the achievement of more equitable international
trading conditions and the restriction of the U.S. balance-of-trade position, the
President is given authority to continue the exclusion from the investment [tax]
credit for foreign produced property after the termination of the temporary addi-
tional import duty. He may exercise this authority with respect to an article (or
class of articles) manufactured in a foreign country if he determines that the
country maintains burdensome non-tariff trade restrictions against U.S. exports
or engages in discriminatory actions or policies which unjustifiably restrict U.S.
exports.Id
104. The conference committee's statement that "[the] trade restrictions and discrimi-
natory acts referred to by this provision are the same as those contained in section 252(b)
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962" includes the Eighty-seventh Congress's interpreta-
tion of United States commerce. The phrase "unjustifiably restricting United States com-
merce" modifies "discriminatory and other acts." Section 48(a)(7)(D) was not intended
to apply to any acts a foreign country engaged in, but only to those that had the result of
"unjustifiably restricting United States commerce."
105. Luther Hodges, the Secretary of State, testified before the Senate Committee on
Finance:
The only way to meet those targets [increase the growth rate of the gross national
product, establish full production capacity, and reduce unemployment] is to sell
more products, to expand the markets in which the goods of American industry,
farms, mines and fisheries are sold .... The Trade Expansion Act will pave
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the President to suspend tariff concessions in response to foreign
trade barriers.' 6 In particular, the reports of both the House Ways
and Means Committee 07 and the Senate Finance Committee ana-
lyzed subsection 252(b) in this manner. The Senate Finance Com-
mittee report specifically stated: "subsections (a) and (b) of section
252 of the bill together authorize action against burdensome foreign
import restrictions." 10 8 Third, the Eighty-seventh Congress was not
concerned with the level of imports. The United States' balance of
trade surplus had increased from $4592 billion in 1960 to $5344 bil-
lion in 1961.109
The language and structure of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
confirm the interpretation of "United States commerce," as used
throughout the Act, as United States export trade. The Finance
Committee's statement that "subsections (a) and (b) . . .together
authorize action against burdensome foreign import restrictions" 110
indicates that Congress intended the subsections to work in conjunc-
tion with each other. The phrase "United States commerce" must
therefore have the same meaning in both subsections.
Subsection (a) of section 252 authorized the President to refrain
from negotiating the reduction of foreign import restrictions when-
ever he found that "unjustifiable foreign import restrictions
impair[ed] the value of tariff commitments made to the United
States, oppress[ed] the commerce of the United States, or prevent[ed]
the expansion of trade on a mutually advantageous basis.""' The
the way for greater growth by providing access to new expanding world markets.
Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Hearings Before the Committee on Finance on H. 11,970,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1961) (statement of Luther Hodges, Secretary of Commerce)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
106. Senator Paul Douglas was particularly concerned whether section 252 should
give the President the power to proclaim increases in tariffs or import restrictions in addi-
tion to authorizing him to suspend the benefits of concessions. His comments demon-
strate Congress's understanding that section 252 applied to American exports. He stated
to Charles Shuman, President of the American Farm Bureau Association: "I am very
glad that you have endorsed section 252 which authorizes the President to suspend
decreases in our tariffs to the European countries if they use levies, import licenses or the
like, or impede the movement into the Common Market of American farm products."
Senate Hearings, supra note 105, at 306-07 (statement of Sen. Paul Douglas).
107. The House Ways and Means Committee Report's explanation of subsection
252(b) stated:
Your committee does not believe that there can be effective use of the trade
agreement process to lower trade barriers if unjustifiable restrictions of a tariff or
nontariff nature are maintained or erected, or other actions are taken which are
inconsistent with trade agreement commitments. When such barriers are placed
in the way of trade, trade agreements cannot fully attain the objective sought.
H. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1962).
108. S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962).
109. Senate Hearings, supra note 105, at 173.
110. S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962).
111. Section 252(a) provided in full:
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"value" of tariff commitments would be impaired by foreign import
restrictions when a foreign country's import restrictions caused its
exports to the United States to be so disproportionate to its admis-
sion of American exports as to harm American industry. If the
phrase "oppress the commerce of the United States" in subsection
252(a) is to have any independent meaning,"12 the phrase must be
construed to refer to burdens on United States export trade and not
burdens on domestic industry. The subsection 252(b)(1) burden on
"United States commerce in a manner inconsistent with provisions
of trade agreements" likewise refers to United States foreign trade.
The provisions of a trade agreement under the reciprocal trade pol-
icy would require a foreign country to accept increased American
exports in return for American concessions. Foreign import restric-
tions could correspondingly burden American commerce in an
inconsistent manner only if a foreign country decreased its admis-
sion of American exports. The restrictions on United States com-
merce in section 252(b)(2) thus must be construed to refer to United
States foreign trade in order that subsections 252(a) and 252(b)(1)
may be applied consistently.
In addition, Congress provided protection for American indus-
try harmed by an increased level of imports in Title III of the 1962
Act. Sections 301 and 302 specifically authorized the Tariff Com-
mission to determine whether foreign products were "being
imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to
cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to the domestic industry
(a) Whenever unjustifiable foreign import restrictions impair the value of
tariff commitments made to the United States, oppress the commerce of the
United States, or prevent the expansion of trade on a mutually advantageous
basis, the President shall-
(1) take all appropriate and feasible steps within his power to eliminate
such restrictions,
(2) refrain from negotiating the reduction or elimination of any United
States import restriction under section 201(a) in order to obtain the reduc-
tion or elimination of any such restrictions, and
(3) notwithstanding any provision of any trade agreement under this
Act and to the extent he deems necessary and appropriate, impose duties or
other import restrictions on the products of any foreign country or instru-
mentality establishing or maintaining such foreign import restrictions
against United States agricultural products, when he deems such duties and
other import restrictions necessary and appropriate to prevent the establish-
ment or obtain the removal of such foreign import restrictions and to pro-
vide access for United States agricultural products to the markets of such
country or instrumentality on an equitable basis.
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 252(a), 76 Stat. 872, 879. See supra
note 41 for the text of section 252(b).
112. A basic rule of statutory construction is that a statute should be interpreted to
give effect to all its provisions, such that no part renders another part superfluous or
redundant. See 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, at 63
(1973).
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. . ,",13 If Congress had thus intended to authorize the President
to suspend tariff reductions when increased imports harmed Ameri-
can industry, such a provision would have been found in Title III.
Furthermore, Congress used the term "domestic industry" through-
out Title 111.114 This use illustrates Congress' intent to distinguish
between domestic commerce and "United States commerce's" exclu-
sive scope of foreign trade in subsections 252(a) and 252(b)(1). 15
Even if President Reagan had chosen to abandon the distinction
between United States export trade and United States domestic com-
merce, Houdaille's petition would still fail to establish that the Japa-
nese Government's policies have restricted United States
commerce. 16 The subsection 48(a)(7)(D)(ii) language "other acts
(including tolerance of international cartels) or policies"" 7 would
have included the Japanese Government's promotion of the national
cartel, 1 8 if such action were found to "restrict" commerce. 19 A car-
113. See supra note 36.
114. See Trade Expansion Act of 1962 §§ 301-320, 351-361.
115. The reading of "United States commerce" as "United States export trade" is also
consistent with the meaning Congress ascribed to "American commerce" in section
350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. As with the phrase "international cartel,"
the Administration's intent that section 242 of H.R. 9900 have the same effect as section
350(a), as amended, and the House's use of H.R. 9900 as a model for H.R. 11970 suggest
that the terms of section 350 and 252(b) should be construed consistently. See supra text
accompanying notes 81-84. Although the 1934 Act never defined "American com-
merce," the purpose of the amendment, like the purpose of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, was to increase American export trade. See supra notes 10-20 and accompanying
text. In addition, the House Ways and Means Committee used "commerce" to refer to
American export trade only in its report. See H. REP. No. 1000, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9
(1934).
116. Section 48 authorizes the President to deny the tax credit to any goods imported
from a country that has restricted United States commerce by pursuing the acts and
policies contained in subsections 48(a)(7)(D)(i) and 48(a)(7)(D)(ii). See infra note 126
and accompanying text. The petition assumes that the President can deny the credit only
to goods like or similar to the restricted products.
117. See supra note 2.
118. A "national cartel' is a cartel composed of companies of a single nationality. See
supra note 90 and accompanying text.
119. Section 48(a)(7)(D) authorizes the President to deny the tax credit to the products
of any country that engages in "discriminatory or other acts (including tolerance of inter-
national cartels) or policies unjustifiably restricting United States commerce." I.R.C.
§ 48(a)(7)(D)(ii). See supra note 2. No member of Congress or administration official
specifically defined the acts and policies included in the phrase "discriminatory or other
acts... or policies" at any stage of the passage of the Trade Agreement Act of 1934,
House Joint Resolution 111, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, or the Revenue Act of
1971. The hearings and debates indicate, however, that "discriminatory acts" refers to
the imposition of any duty, nontariff barrier to trade, or other policy that disadvantages
American products more than it burdens other imports or the domestic goods of the
country adopting the policy. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 105, at 168 (statement
of Sen. Carl Curtis); Hearings Before the Committee on Finance on H..J Resolution 111,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1943) (statement of Francis Sayre, Assistant to the Secretary of
State); 117 CONG. REc. 42,664 (1971) (statement of Sen. Russell Long). The petition
does not allege that the Japanese Government has taxed American machine tools more
heavily than any other machine tools, has placed import restrictions on American
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tel "restricts" commerce by using its control over the market for a
particular product to restrict output and to charge a high price for
that product.120 Pursuant to the ordinances of the Japanese Govern-
ment that promoted the formation of the cartel, however, the Japa-
nese machine tool manufacturers have increased production' 21 and
decreased the prices' 22 of exported machine tool parts. 123 The cartel
machine tools, or has pursued any other policy that burdens United States products more
than the products of any other country. A denial of the accelerated depreciation deduc-
tion, see supra note 72, to any American owned companies manufacturing machine tools
in Japan would be a "discriminatory policy." The petition, however, presents no evi-
dence that any American manufacturers would be eligible for the deduction. Although
the Japanese Government denies loans at concessionary interest rates, see supra note 71,
and subsidies, see supra note 70, to the American manufacturers, these benefits lack the
burdensome effect on American products that "discriminatory acts" seems to require.
This Note therefore analyzes the ability of the President to deny the investment tax credit
pursuant to the "other acts. . . or policies" criteria of section 48(a)(7)(D)(ii).
120. As Representative Dewey explained to the House of Representatives:
Cartels are usually based upon the efforts of small groups of powerful monop-
olies to corner supplies of raw materials, to amass huge patent structures and to
employ their financial strength to "regulate" output, divide markets, allocate
fields of production and maintain monopolistic price levels ....
.. . International monopolies which restrict production, maintain artificial and
exorbitant price levels, and attempt to segregate spheres of influence among
themselves can effectively defeat the best intentions [to stabilize the world econ-
omy].
89 CONG. REc. 4180-81 (1943) (statement of Rep. Charles Dewey).
121. The Japanese production of numerically controlled machining centers increased
from 526 units in 1976 to 5,231 units in 1980. Petition to the President, supra note 4, at
119-20, 128 (citing JAPAN, MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY, YEAR-
BOOK OF FINANCIAL STATISTICS; JAPAN, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, JAPAN EXPORTS AND
IMPORTS: COMMODITY BY COUNTRY). The petition implied that the production goals
established by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry for the production of
machine cutting tools pursuant to its authority under the Extraordinary Measures Laws,
see supra note 61, have permitted the Japanese manufacturers to expand their total pro-
duction sufficiently to increase their exports of machine cutting tools to the United States.
Petition to the President, supra note 4, at 129-38.
122. Every Japanese exporter of numerically controlled machining centers and
numerically controlled lathes must obtain approval from the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry for the price of each shipment of these machine tools to the United
States. See Ministerial Ordinance Concerning Export Approval Pursuant to the Export
and Import Trading Law, Ministerial Ordinance of the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry No. 54 (as amended effective Mar. 27, 1978) Art. 1, Sched. 1 (1955),
reprinted in Petition to the President, supra note 4, at D208, D21 1; Enforcement Order of
the Export and Import Trading Law, Cabinet Order No. 244 (as amended effective Mar.
27, 1978) Art. 1(8), reprinted in Petition to the President, supra note 4, at D196, D197
(1955); Petition to the President, supra note 4, at 92-96. Houdaille alleged that the price
agreed upon by the Japanese Government and the exporters is based upon a governmerit
ceiling price. Petition to the President, supra note 4, at 94-95.
123. Houdaille could have alleged that the cartel had unjustifiably restricted United
States commerce if the cartel used its control over the Japanese markets to restrict the
sales of American-made machine tool parts. Apart from establishing export pricing poli-
cies, however, none of the ordinances passed by the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry establish different production and quality standards for exported machine tools
and machine tools produced for the Japanese market. Extraordinary Measures Law No.
3 indicates that the cartel does not use its control over the Japanese market to restrict
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has displaced the sales of Houdaille and the other machine tool
manufacturers by price competition rather than by restricting sales
through decreasing its members' output. Although cartels may
engage in predatory pricing to gain control of a market, 124
Houdaille's petition presented no evidence that the Japanese manu-
facturers have priced the machine tools at a level calculated to force
American machine tool manufacturers out of the United States
market. 125
C. CURRENT TRADE STATUTES
Houdaille's failure to establish that the Japanese Government's
promotion of the machine tool cartel has restricted the sales of
American-made machine tools did not preclude President Reagan
from suspending the investment tax credit for purchasers of Japa-
nese machine tools. Section 48(a)(7)(D) does not require that the
products ineligible for the investment tax credit be identical or simi-
lar to the products whose sale the offending country has restricted.
Rather, the section authorizes the President to suspend the tax credit
"to any article or class of articles manufactured or produced in [the]
foreign country" maintaining the nontariff trade restrictions or
engaging in "discriminatory or other acts." 126 Section 48(a)(7)(D)
thus permits the President to deny the application of the tax credit to
purchasers of the Japanese machine tools if the Japanese Govern-
ment has burdened or restricted any American exports by pursuing
the policies or acts specified in subsection 48(a)(7)(D)(i) or subsec-
tion 48(a)(7)(D)(ii).
A suspension of the tax credit by President Reagan would have
constituted a retaliation against the particular restrictive practices of
production and raise prices. Article 7 requires that any Ministry instructions for taking
concerted action present "no likelihood of being unduly detrimental to the interests of
consumers in general as well as persons engaged in related industries." Extraordinary
Measures Law No. 3 Art. 7(2), supra note 61, at D 119.
124. 89 CONG. REc. 4180-81 (1943) (statement of Rep. Charles Dewey).
125. Houdaille alleged only that the price discounts offered by the Japanese manufac-
turers and the increasing displacement of American machine tool sales suggests the use
of a ceiling price in the export-price approval process discussed in footnote 122, supra.
Petition to the President, supra note 4, at 95. The emphasis of the ordinances promul-
gated by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry pursuant to the Extraordinary
Measures Laws, especially Extraordinary Measures Law No. 3, on promoting joint
research, standardizing manufacturing components, and centralizing production, how-
ever, suggests that the low prices alternatively resulted from an increase in efficiency and
the development of economies of scale. For a discussion of Extraordinary Measures Law
No. 3 and the ordinances issued under it, see supra note 61.
126. See supra note 2 (emphasis added). The Senate report explained, "This authority
[to continue the denial of the credit on a selective basis] may be exercised with respect to
an article or class of articles manufactured in a foreign country or countries or across the
board." S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1971).
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the Japanese Government found to have triggered the applicability
of section 48(a)(7)(D). Section 48(a)(7)(D), like its predecessor stat-
utes, is a retaliatory measure' 27 designed to pressure a country to
remove its tariff or nontariff trade barriers, or to discontinue other
policies that restrict United States exports. 28 Houdaille, however,
proposed to use section 48(a)(7)(D) as a remedial measure. In par-
ticular, Houdaille contended that section 48(a)(7)(D) constituted an
appropriate response to the displacement of American machine tool
sales because the denial of the credit would have forced the Japanese
manufacturers to withdraw their products from the American
market.129
Section 48(a)(7)(D) is not a remedial measure. The section
lacks the cause and effect relationship, characteristic of remedial
measures, between the importing practice the section attempts to off-
set and the injury suffered by the industry receiving relief. The
countervailing duty, o30 anti-dumping' 3' and escape clause 132 reme-
dies all require that the burdened imports be of the same type as the
127. United States remedial policies assist domestic producers injured by increased
imports by placing duties or import restrictions on the competitive imported goods. See
infra text accompanying notes 130-39. The purpose of section 48(a)(7)(D), however, is to
persuade foreign governments to discontinue practices that restrict United States com-
merce. See supra note 100. Senator Jacob Javits' characterization of the denial of the
credit to purchasers of foreign equipment for the duration of the surcharge as a
"weapon" confirms the retaliatory nature of section 48. 117 CONG. REc. 42,663 (state-
ment of Sen. Jacob Javits). Similarly the 1962 Congress viewed section 252 as a negotiat-
ing chip and a means of "punishing" countries who violated section 252. See, e.g., Senate
Hearings, supra note 105, at 54, 308-09.
128. See supra note 100.
129. Petition to the President, supra note 4, at 50-56. See also supra notes 74-77 and
accompanying text. Houdaille's request for the suspension of the tax credit for an indefi-
nite period of time and for a review of the desirability of continuing the denial of the
credit five years after the suspension emphasizes the remedial characterization of
Houdaille's proposed use of the surcharge. The review "should assess the health of the
United States NC [Ze., numerically controlled] machining center and NC punching
machine industry, including its ability to satisfy current and anticipated defense require-
ments." Petition to the President, supra note 4, at 16.
130. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671-1671f (1982). Countervailing duties may be imposed
when any country provides any "bounty or grant" or "subsidy" to the production, manu-
facture, or export of merchandise imported into the United States. Id §§ 1303(a),
1671(a). If the foreign country is a party to the GATT Subsidies and Countervailing
Duties Code, GATT Doec. MTN/NTM/W/232, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1979), as is Japan, the subsidy must also materially injure, threaten
with material injury, or materially retard the establishment of an industry in the United
States. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982).
131. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673i (1982). Anti-dumping duties are available where "a
class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States
at less than its fair value." Id § 1673. The importation of the goods must materially
injure, threaten with material injury, or retard the establishment of an industry in the
United States. Id
132. Id §§ 2251-2394. The escape clause sections provide for the imposition of duties
or a limit on imports and adjustment assistance, if "an article is being imported into the
United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or
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goods assisted by the American response, and that the increased
import flow be the cause of the injury to the domestic industry
benefitted by the American response.133 The President's use of sec-
tion 48(a)(7)(D) as a remedial measure in response to Houdaille's
petition would have produced the anomalous result of providing
competitive assistance to American manufacturers while dis-
advantaging related foreign imports not primarily responsible for the
depressed sales of the manufacturer's products.134 The danger of
retaliatory action by the foreign country whose goods are disadvan-
taged by a remedial measure requires that the United States impose
remedial measures only when they address the cause of the injury to
the domestic concern. 135
The President's inability to vary the amount by which the denial
of the tax credit burdens foreign imports also militates against use of
the suspension of the tax credit as a remedial measure. American
remedial trade policies seek to offset the burden the offending gov-
ernment's practice places on American goods. Anti-dumping and
countervailing duties enable a domestic producer to compete with
similar foreign goods by placing duties on the foreign goods equal to
the amount by which the foreign market value of the products
exceeds the United States price of the merchandise 36 and by impos-
ing duties equal to the net subsidies to the imports. 137 Furthermore,
the escape clause section authorizes the President to impose import
the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competi-
tive with the imported article." Ira §§ 2251-2253.
133. See id § 1671 (countervailing duties imposed on parties to the GATT Subsidies
and Countervailing Duties Code); § 1673 (anti-dumping duties); §§ 2251-2253 (escape
clause proceeding). The imposition of countervailing duties on countries that are not
parties to the GATT Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Codes provides the only
exception to the requirement that the goods imported must be found to be a cause of
injury to the domestic industry. The article imported into the United States simply must
be the recipient of a bounty or grant. Id § 1303(a)(1).
134. An industry's depressed sales may be due primarily to factors other than import
competition. For example, the poor quality of the product produced or high prices gen-
erated by an inefficient production process may be the primary cause of low domestic
demand for the good.
135. The escape clause sections provide the most explicit congressional recognition of
this potential problem. Prior to the President's provision of import relief, the Interna-
tional Trade Commission must determine that an article is being imported into the
United States "in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury,
or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly com-
petitive with the imported article." 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982). In subsequently deter-
mining whether to provide import relief to the industry, the President must consider "the
efforts being made or to be implemented by the industry concerned to adjust to import
competition" and "the effect of import relief on the international economic interests of
the United States." Id §§ 2252(c)(3), 225 1(c)(5).
136. Id §§ 1673, 1673e.
137. Id §§ 1303(a), 1671(a), 1671e.
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restrictions 138 to the extent such restrictions are necessary both to
prevent or alleviate the injury to a domestic industry and to facilitate
the adjustment of the industry to the increased import competi-
tion.139 Section 48(a)(7)(D) only provides the President with the
choice of denying the credit or of allowing foreign imports to remain
eligible for favorable tax treatment. The denial of the credit will
always effectively increase the price of the imported good propor-
tionately to the amount of the investment tax credit to which a pro-
ducer would otherwise be entitled. The loss of the credit may
therefore be an ineffective remedy if the increased effective cost of
imported products is insufficient to restore American products to a
competitive position. Thus, President Reagan correctly refused to
suspend the investment tax credit to provide remedial relief to the
machine tool industry.
The retaliatory measures authorized by section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974140 obviate any need to expand the meaning of United
States commerce in section 48(a)(7)(D) to encompass United States
domestic commerce. A foreign country can harm the domestic sale
of American products primarily by providing subsidies and other fis-
cal favors that enable the foreign producers to sell products at an
artificially depressed price, or by promoting or tolerating the forma-
tion of a cartel that eventually acquires control over the American
market.141 Section 301142 authorizes the President to retaliate
138. If the President decides to provide import relief under the sections, the Act
authorizes him to:
(1) proclaim an increase in, or imposition of, any duty on the article causing or
threatening to cause serious injury to such industry;
(2) proclaim a tariff-rate quota on such article;
(3) proclaim a modification of, or imposition of, any quantitative restriction on
the import into the United States of such article;
(4) negotiate, conclude, and carry out orderly marketing agreements with for-
eign countries limiting the export from foreign countries and the import into the
United States of such articles; or
(5) take any combination of such actions.
Id § 2253(a).
139. Id
140. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1974).
141. The sale of American-made products in the domestic market can be harmed
either by the displacement of their sales by sales of foreign goods or by the total inability
of the American producers to manufacture the product because of a cartel's monopolistic
control of a market. Foreign governments enable their industries to sell goods imported
to the United States at low prices or prices which are less than the fair market value of
the goods primarily through the use of subsidies. Subsidies may take the form of cash
payments, reduction of specific tax liability, loans at preferential interest rates, provisions
of goods and services at prices below market value, and government purchases of goods
and services at prices above market price. S. REP. No. 1298, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 164
(1974). Cartels may use their control over a particular market to engage in predatory
pricing, to maintain a monopolistic market to engage in predatory pricing, or to maintain
monopolistic restraints on the production, and to charge high prices. See supra note 120.
142. Section 301, as amended, provides in pertinent part:
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against any act or policy of a foreign country that "is unjust, unrea-
sonable, or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States
commerce." 143  Although section 301 generally addresses only
restrictions or burdens on United States exports, the section does
encompass export subsidies and other incentives having the effect of
subsidies on foreign exports that substantially reduce sales of com-
petitive American products in the United States. 144 The section spe-
cifically requires the President to "take all appropriate and feasible
action within his power to . . . obtain the elimination of such act,
policy or practice."1 45 Under this section, the President may suspend
or refrain from proclaiming the benefits of trade agreement conces-
(a) Determinations requiring action
If the President determines that action by the United States is appropriate-
(1) to enforce the rights of the United States under any trade agreement;
or
(2) to respond to any act, policy, or practice of a foreign country or
instrumentality that-
(A) is inconsistent with the provisions of, or otherwise denies bene-
fits to the United States under, any trade agreement, or
(B) is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens or
restricts United States commerce;
the President shall take all appropriate and feasible action within his power
to enforce such rights or to obtain the elimination of such act, policy, or
practice. Action under this section may be taken on a nondiscriminatory
basis or solely against the products or services of the foreign country or
instrumentality involved.
(b) Other action
Upon making a determination described in subsection (a) of this section, the
President, in addition to taking action referred to in such subsection, may-
(1) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, or refrain from
proclaiming, benefits of trade agreement concessions to carry out a trade
agreement with the foreign country or instrumentality involved; and
(2) impose duties or other import restrictions on the products of, and
fees or restrictions on the services of, such foreign country or instrumentality
for such time as he determines appropriate.
19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(a)-2411(b) (1982).
143. See generally Coffield, Using Section 301 of the TradeAct of 1974 as a Response to
Foreign Government Trade Actions; When, Why, and How, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 381 (1981); Jacobs & Hove, Remediesfor Unfair Import Competition in the United
States, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 23-25 (1980).
144. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 replaced section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
with a new section 301. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 901, 93 Stat.
144,295. Section 301(a)(3) of the 1974 Trade Act authorized the President to take action
to halt the policies of a foreign country when that country "provide[d] subsidies (or other
incentives having the effects of subsidies) on its exports of one or more products to the
United States or to other foreign markets which ha[d] the effect of substantially reducing
sales of the competitive U.S. product or products." Trade Act of 1974 § 301(a)(3). The
new section 301 eliminated this subsection. See supra note 142. Nevertheless, all acts,
policies, or practices covered by the 1974 version of section 301 are covered by section
301 as revised. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 236-37 (1979). For an illustrative
list of recognized export subsidies, see GATT Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code,
supra note 130, at 295 (Annex).
145. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1982).
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sions,146 impose duties on the products of the foreign country,147 or
impose other import restrictions. 14  Although section 301 applies
only to those subsidies and other policies having the effect of export
subsidies, 149 the scope of section 301 is still broader than would be
an expansion of section 48(a)(7)(D) to include domestic commerce.
As previously stated, section 48(a)(7)(D) applies only to those for-
eign acts and policies that "restrict" United States commerce. For-
eign subsidies are consequently excluded from section 48(a)(7)(D)'s
protection because they do not impede the manufacturers' marketing
of the product and thus do not restrict domestic product sales. Sub-
sidies displace similar products by enabling the foreign manufac-
turer or importer to set a price below the prevailing market price. 50
The President's section 301 power to retaliate against export
subsidies that result in the displacement of American products
implicitly includes the power to retaliate against a carters control of
a particular product, to the extent that the cartel receives export sub-
sidies. If a cartel that is not the recipient of export subsidies insti-
tutes pricing policies that displace or restrict American industry's
domestic sales, the cartel would still be subject to governmental
retaliation under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.151 Section 337
prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the
importation or sale of articles to the United States that tend to
"destroy or substantially injure an industry. . . or to prevent the
establishment of. . .an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade
and commerce in the United States .... 1152 The section authorizes
the International Trade Commission to prohibit the entry into the
United States of articles imported in violation of the section, 53 or to
issue an order directing the importers to cease and desist from
146. Id § 2411(b)(1).
147. Id § 2411(b)(2).
148. Id
149. See supra note 144.
150. See deKieffer, When, Why, and How to Bring a Countervailing Duty Proceeding:
4 Complainant's Perspective, 6 N.C. . IN'L L. & COM. R o. 363, 365 (1981).
151. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
152. Section 337(a), as amended, provides:
(a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of arti-
cles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee. or
agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially
injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States, or
to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize
trade and commerce in the United States, are declared unlawful, and when
found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other
provision of law, as provided in this section.
Id § 1337(a).
153. Id § 1337(d).
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engaging in the unfair acts. 154
Section 301 does encompass all of the acts and policies affecting
United States exports against which section 48(a)(7)(D) authorizes
the President to deny the investment tax credit.' 55 Section
48(a)(7)(D) nevertheless -remains an essential instrument in United
States foreign trade policy. Section 48(a)(7)(D) permits the United
States to respond to foreign trade practices when other alternatives
would present a greater risk of retaliation by the foreign country
whose goods are disadvantaged. 5 6 The actions authorized by sec-
tion 301, specifically the denial of trade concessions and the levy of
duties and import restrictions, may severely reduce the sales of for-
eign products in the American market. The serious impact of these
actions consequently invites foreign retaliation against American
exports rather than foreign removal of the offending practice. Con-
versely, the availability of the suspension of the tax credit under sec-
tion 48(a)(7)(D) permits the United States to respond to offending
foreign trade practices with a minimal risk of retaliation. The denial
of the investment tax credit increases the effective cost of foreign
products only by the amount lost due to the unavailability of the
credit. The consequent decline in foreign import sales is thus likely
to be less severe than the decline caused by the imposition of section
301 sanctions or alternative measures.'5 7 The accompanying low risk
154. Id. § 1337(f). Section 337 has historically been applied primarily in patent
infringement cases. Garfinkel, Guide to Import Relief and Unfair Trade ctions Available
Under United States International Trade Law, 15 IN'L LAW. 240, 245 (1980); Jacobs &
Hove, supra note 143, at 19. There is no statutory restriction, however, on the use of
section 337 in response to other trade policies.
In addition to a section 337 proceeding and a section 301 proceeding, an injured Amer-
ican producer may bring a private action against a cartel for damages resulting from
unfair import competition. An injured party can also obtain injunctive relief under the
Wilson Tariff Act of 1894 or the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 26 (1982).
155. The Trade Act of 1974 repealed section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
Trade Act of 1974 § 602(d). Section 301 incorporates and expands the acts and policies
encompassed in section 252. H. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 64-65 (1973). The
scope of section 301 is therefore inclusive of section 48(a)(7)(D) as the acts and policies
contained in section 48(a)(7)(D) are the same as those in section 252(b) of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962. See supra note 57.
156. The Ninety-second Congress partially based its decision to give the President the
authority to suspend the tax credit on the low danger of retaliation. Senator Russell
Long explained to the Senate, "This is a small power compared with the power to impose
a 15 percent tax which is in this bill." 117 CONG. Rc. 42,664 (1971) (statement of Sen.
Russell Long).
157. The Trade Act of 1974, as amended, places no limit on the size of the duty or the
severity of the import restriction the President may impose on the products of a foreign
country pursuant to section 301. The withdrawal of the benefit of trade agreement con-
cessions, also authorized by section 301, similarly allows the President to disadvantage a
foreign product severely, by subjecting imports to the restrictions imposed on them prior
to the trade negotiations conducted with the United States. The loss of the credit, in
contrast, may often increase the effective cost of imports by a small percentage of their
purchase price. Moreover, the denial of the credit may not produce a large decline in
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of retaliation against more minimal losses enables the United States
government to use section 48(a)(7)(D) to respond to foreign trade
practices when the United States would otherwise abstain from
imposing more restrictive retaliatory measures or would prefer to use
a less severe retaliatory response.
Section 48(a)(7)(D) is the only statutory response to foreign
trade practices that does not require an administrative determination
or recommendation. Congress has traditionally required adminis-
trative agencies to conduct investigations and often to hold public
hearings as a prerequisite to governmental decisions to apply reme-
dial or retaliatory trade measures. 58 Congress has recognized the
importance of determining the precise nature of a country's trade
practice prior to invoking any trade statute. The information gather-
ing procedures serve two primary purposes. First, they promote a
determination of whether the country is indeed pursuing the policy
and causing the apparent effects to which the United States is con-
templating a response.' 59 Second, they allow the administrative
body gathering the information to evaluate the economic interests of
the United States in adopting the response in issue. 160
Because of the relatively small danger of retaliation posed by
the denial of the investment tax credit under section 48(a)(7)(D), it is
feasible to provide the President with exclusive discretion to decide
whether or not to suspend the credit.' 6' Nevertheless, the vesting of
exclusive discretion to make this determination in the President
poses two dangers. First, the President may deny the credit when a
foreign country is not restricting United States commerce and may
thus produce political strains between the two countries. Such
strained relations might prompt the foreign country to impose recip-
rocal trade sanctions against the United States. Second, the Presi-
dent's unilateral discretion precludes consideration of whether the
alleged restrictive policy would be capable of resolution by consulta-
tion or by various international dispute mechanisms. 62 The detri-
sales to the extent purchasers base their choice of capital equipment on the purchase
price of equipment. The loss of the credit increases the price of capital equipment indi-
rectly by increasing the purchaser's tax liability after he has bought the equipment.
158. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1982) (section 337 proceeding); id § 2251(c)
(escape clause proceeding); id § 2412(b)(2) (section 301 action).
159. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (section 337 proceeding); id § 2251(d) (escape
clause proceeding); id § 2414 (section 301 action). See also S. RP. No. 249, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 238-39 (1979).
160. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (1982) (escape clause proceeding); id § 2413 (sec-
tion 301 proceeding).
161. See supra note 157.
162. The amendments to section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act require use of interna-
tional dispute settlement mechanisms in various instances. The amendments, which
were passed primarily to implement the 1979 Multilateral Trade Negotiations, require
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mental effects of such preclusion become evident when the use of
such mechanisms would more effectively eliminate a particular trade
practice than would retaliatory action. Consultations and dispute
mechanisms specifically provide for an immediate discussion of the
controversy. Retaliation, on the other hand, may produce negotia-
tions only after the actualization of the economic effects of the
sanction.
The possibility that the President may deny the tax credit to a
foreign country whose policies do not restrict United States com-
merce and that a period of undue delay may elapse prior to the com-
mencement of negotiations suggests that Congress should amend
section 48(a)(7)(D). In particular, Congress should provide for an
administrative body to investigate the apparently discriminatory
practice and to evaluate the desirability and potential effectiveness of
suspending the investment tax credit. Due to the minimal financial
burden and the low risk of retaliation associated with the denial of
the application of the tax credit, relative to the imposition of duties
and other measures, public hearings are not necessary to evaluate a
prospective suspension. Furthermore, the need for a retaliatory pol-
icy which responds quickly to an offending foreign trade practice
and which communicates the United States' displeasure requires that
such an amended section 48(a)(7)(D) authorize the President to act
in his sole discretion, thus bypassing the administrative investigation
stage, in cases demanding expeditious action.
CONCLUSION
President Reagan properly rejected Houdaille Industries' peti-
tion that he deny the investment tax credit to purchasers of Japanese
the United States Trade Representative to request consultations with the foreign country
concerned when a party files a petition requesting relief pursuant to section 301. If the
issues raised in the petition are covered by a trade agreement and are not resolved during
any consultation period specified in the agreement, the Trade Representative must
request proceedings on the matter under the dispute settlement procedures of the agree-
ment. 19 U.S.C. § 2413 (1982). Although the effectiveness of international dispute
mechanisms has been criticized, see, e.g., Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the
Tokyo Round- An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145 (1980), the Senate
Report recognized that the changes made in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations with
respect to dispute settlement procedures "offer possibilities of significantly improving the
process and the results of international dispute settlement with respect to international
trade issues." S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 235 (1979). The Senate Report
continued:
The new section... builds upon existing practice in formalizing the interna-
tional consultation process, and additionally requires resort to dispute settlement
in matters covered by agreements. This provision will provide the needed direc-
tion for moving forward internationally under the dispute settlement process at
the same time the domestic investigation is pending.
S. RaP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 239 (1979).
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machine tools pursuant to his authority under section 48(a)(7)(D) of
the Internal Revenue Code. Congressional intent and the statutory
scheme of the United States trade laws establish that the President of
the United States should deny the investment tax credit only when
he wishes to retaliate against foreign trade practices that affect
United States export trade. Moreover, when basing his authority to
deny the investment tax credit on the acts of an international cartel,
the President should ensure that the members of the cartel in issue
are of more than one nationality. The President's authority to deny
the investment tax credit under section 48(a)(7)(D), when construed
in this manner and when subjected to appropriate procedural safe-
guards, will provide the United States with a valuable means of
responding to unfair foreign trade practices against United States
exports.
Claudia . Dumas
